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Total medical care expenditures in the United States in 1978 were $192
billion. Of that amount, $35.3 billion, or only 18.3%, represented pay-
ments for physicians' services. In the manufacturing sector, profits before
taxes were about 13% of total expenditures. Looking at this first set of
figures, one might be tempted to conclude that physicians are of rela-
tively minor importance in the health care system, and that the prices,
fees, or other incentives which they experience are of little consequence.
In a sense this is true; a substantial reduction in physician fees (say,
25%) would have little effect on total medical spending.
1 By the same
token, however, a 25% reduction in profits would have little effect on
most product prices. The major theme of this study is that physician-
returns play a role in the medical care sector which is analogous to that
played by profits in the for-profit sector. Just as the incentive pro-
vided by the relatively small fraction of total spending that is profits
determines the form and use of all inputs and outputs in conventional
markets, similarly the relatively small amount that goes to physicians
provides the financial incentive which determines the bulk of resource
use, output quantities and characteristics, and total costs in the health
sector.
There has been fairly extensive study of the market for physicians'
services, and of physician time as an input into these services, especially
with regard to physician provision of ambulatory care. The general focus
of the analysis here is different: this analysis will be concerned with the
effects physicians have on the use of medical inputs other than the physi-
cian's own input or those inputs for which he pays directly. There will
be a similar consideration of the effects of physicians and physician
incentives on the markets for kinds of medical care other than physi-
cian's services. Physician behavior will be examined not just in the office,
but also in the hospital and in all of the physician's "workshops." The2 Chapter One
focus will be not just on the physician's own actions, but also on the
effects of those actions on the environment in which he works and on
the resources with which he works.
The parallel which has been drawn between physician expenditures
and profits, like all analogies, is not perfect. There are some additional
aspects of physician behavior to be emphasized. The most important of
these is the physician's role as provider of information to demanders.
The physician not only coordinates the output production process, as
does the classical entrepreneur, but he also provides information to
potential demanders on the need for and value of services that he or
others will provide. This represents a kind of relationship between buyer
and seller which falls outside the scope of the standard neoclassical
models, whether competitive or monopolistic. While there are some
similarities between physician advice and advertising, the integration of
information and services provision will be the most distinctive feature
of the models that will be discussed.
A second difference concerns what might be reasonable to postulate
as the physician's maximand. Maximizing profits is an acceptable as-
sumption for most businesses, but maximization solely of physician
money income is not a plausible assumption for physicians. Instead,
much of what is to be explained empirically will require broadening
the set of arguments that concern the physician's utility function. While
models of a utility-maximizing entrepreneur are not unknown, the econ-
omy of theory and the empirical relevance of the money income maxi-
mization approach will not be available in this study.
The physician, like the classical entrepreneur, really performs two
functions: (1) he organizes and directs the production process, and
(2) he provides some productive input. In the case of the entrepreneur,
his equity capital investment provides some of the firm's capital stock.
In the case of the physician, his own time is a useful and often essential
productive unit. While the importance of capital to the production of
output has always been recognized, and while the role of physician time
in the production of office-based ambulatory care has also been subject
to scrutiny, an important part of total physician time has been ignored
or treated haphazardly. This is the time the physician spends caring for
patients in hospitals. The fraction of total working time spent at the
hospital varies according to the physician's specialization, of course, but
what sketchy information we have suggests that it averages about 30%
of physician time, and may be more than half of total time for the
hospital-oriented surgical specialties.
2 In order to round out our under-
standing of how physicians affect the use of all inputs, including those
not paid for by the physician, it is necessary to incorporate physicians'
time into the analysis of hospital production.Physicians as Agents
In principle, of course, physician time input also affects the produc-
tivity of other ways of treating patients. More time spent diagnosing or
monitoring may make drug therapy more effective and nursing home
care more productive. But it will not be possible to treat those subjects
here.
A Taxonomy of Physician Pricing Models
In order to explain how physicians affect the use of other inputs, we
need to understand how physician prices are set. This is ultimately an
empirical question, on which there is presently no consensus. It will
be helpful to try to classify alternative theories which have been sug-
gested. Figure 1, an extension of a scheme developed by Uwe Rein-
hardt,










































The rows refer to the extent of individual physician control over
price. The physician may, as in the first row, take a going price as given,
either because competition forces him to do so, or because insurance
reimbursement policy, administrative difficulties of changing prices, or
government price controls compel him to accept a given price for any
output he produces. In the other row, the physician is assumed to have
some control over the price he can charge and still obtain business. The
columns reflect alternative assumptions, one dealing with whether or not
the price attains a level at which supply and demand are equated, and
the market clears; the other dealing with whether or not the individual
physician is able to shift the demand for his own services by varying4 Chapter One
what he suggests to patients. (There could also be a fourth column, in
which demand is shifted and markets do not clear, but that would only
represent a combination of the second and third columns.)
The cells provide a way to classify possible models. Cell 1 would be
the usual competitive market. If the physician services' market were of
this nature, both demand and supply curves could be estimated. If the
market were the standard textbook monopoly in cell 2, the market,
individual, or firm-level demand curves could be estimated. It would
not, however, be possible to estimate a firm or physician supply curve
of output. The output the monopolist physician would choose would
depend upon the configuration of the entire demand curve, not just the
price he happened to charge. There are some assumptions that might be
made which would make it possible to estimate a quasi-supply curve or
offer curve, but it is not clear that these assumptions would be legitimate.
So far, however, these are standard problems in estimating models of
any market. The peculiar problems of the medical care industry begin
to emerge in the other cells. A price which physicians take as given may
be set below the level which permits markets to clear, as in cell 3. This
is most likely to happen if, either because of insurance reimbursement
limits or because of price controls, the price is not permitted to rise. It
may also represent a state of disequilibrium, in which prices are grad-
ually rising to their equilibrium levels. In this case, no demand curve for
physician services can be estimated; the only points observed are those
on the supply curve.
In cell 4 the physician controls his own price. If he is an income
maximizer, he would set the price at the monopoly level, and satisfy all
the demand at that price. But he may have goals other than income, and
pursuit of these goals may prompt him to set price below the monopoly
level, and refuse to produce enough to satisfy the demand at that price.
The distinction between cells 3 and 4 arises from the source of excess
demand. In cell 3, price is exogenous to any individual physician. In
such a case, it is the constraint on his willingness to supply that causes
excess demand to occur. Excess demand may arise for the usual reason:
price may equal the physician's marginal cost (including the opportunity
cost of his own time) at a quantity which is less than that demanded
from him. If he has preferences as to the kinds of cases he will treat, it
is possible to have excess demand for some kinds, while other, more
desirable kinds are selected to be treated. The trade-off between leisure
and work may depend on the kind of work to be done. If there is an
"insufficient" amount of desirable cases, he may not be willing to supply
as much labor time at a given price as when the mix of outputs is more
to his liking.
In cell 4, however, the physician sets the price. He may not be willing
to produce all of the output demanded at this price, for the reasons toPhysicians as Agents
be discussed later. In this case we obviously cannot observe the demand
curve. It is also true that we cannot observe a supply curve either, since
the monopolist by definition is not able to sell all he wants at given
prices. In cell 3 excess demand need not require physicians to have
more in their utility functions than income and leisure, if prices are fixed
by law or are sticky. But in cell 4 excess demand can only exist if physi-
cians for some reason receive utility from its existence.
In all of these cases, the individual physician takes the demand curve
which confronts him as given. We will now consider models in which
the physician can create or shift the demand curve which confronts him.
In cell 5, he would obviously only have an incentive to do so if price
exceeds marginal opportunity cost; at prices below that point, the situa-
tion is the same as that in cell 3. If price is above marginal cost, it is
possible to show how demand will be created (this will be done in a
later chapter).
Finally, in cell 6 the physician chooses the price he wishes to charge
on a demand curve which he manipulates. Precise analysis is difficult
here because behavior depends on the way in which the demand curve
shifts as information is changed, and there are no comfortable a priori
conjectures on this. We can, however, use this model to provide some
conditional statements about market response.
The Physician as Agent
Many medical goods and services are not demanded directly by pa-
tients, but are requested on the patient's behalf by a physician. Indeed,
in some cases, such as prescription drugs or hospital care, the patient is
not even legally permitted to demand the items. And yet economists
have persisted in estimating consumer demand curves for medical care
in the same way as for other goods over whose purchase the consumer
has direct control. How can the supposed response of use to consumer
income and user price be rationalized when consumers are not, in large
part, making the relevant decisions? Feldstein has suggested that an
answer might be constructed on an assumption that the physician acts
as the patient's agent.
4 In this role, the physician demands (or has the
patient acquiesce in demanding) exactly those quantities of care of
various types that the patient would choose if he had the information
and knowledge that the physician has.
5 If the physician were to act as a
pure or perfect agent, his ostensible maximand would be the patient's
utility, and his choices would duplicate the choices the patient would
make, if the patient had the same information as does the physician.
While much of medical ethics can be interpreted as an attempt to use
moral suasion to persuade physicians to adopt the agent's role, there
are reasons to expect that the physician may not act as a pure agent and6 Chapter One
that his maximand need not be the fully informed patient's maximand.
First, it is not obvious that any physician will have the information
needed to permit him to act as a perfect agent, even if he wishes to do
so. While the patient may be ignorant about the way to produce health
or other attributes of medical care, he alone knows how much health he
desires. The physician may be better informed about the technology for
producing health, but he may be poorly informed about the patient's
demand for health. On balance, the patient may be better informed than
the physician. This assymetry of information has often been noted, but
it has less often been recognized that it is an assymetry in type of infor-
mation, not necessarily in amount. Indeed, Smallwood and Smith have
even suggested that, when confronted with the difficult task of reading
his patient's preferences, the physician may give up altogether and con-
centrate only on equal physically measurable outputs, such as changes
in probability of death.
6 Whether or not physicians behave in this way,
it is worth noting that physician ignorance can be as important as pa-
tient ignorance in causing deviations of actual from ideal outcomes.
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Second, even if he had the requisite information, the physician may
not in fact act as a perfect agent. It is not usually assumed that any
other economic actor chooses only with the interests of his customer in
mind. From Adam Smith on, economists have argued that benevolence
in producers of goods and services is neither to be expected nor neces-
sarily desired. But if the physician manages the care of the patient with
his own interests—income, leisure, interest of work—in mind, then he
would not necessarily be acting as a perfect agent.
Thus there are reasons to expect that the agency relationship will not
be perfect. But in order to get much further, two additional questions
must be answered. How would the physician be expected to act if he is
not acting as the patient's agent? And equally important, how is the
extent of his departure from perfect agency determined? I intend to
show that it will generally be both possible and likely that the physician
will depart from the role of perfect agent, but that there are constraints
on the extent of this departure. Perhaps more surprisingly, I shall show
that the physician will choose medical care inputs so as to minimize the
cost of producing a given level of health even if he is not acting as the
patient's agent, but rather as a selfish income maximizer. I shall show
that, given a suitably broad definition of cost, a similar proposition holds
for a much wider class of physician utility functions as well.
Some Difficulties in the Notion of Agency
The concept of agency is most transparent for the situation in which
all services are sold in competitive markets. The agent's only task then
is to choose the quantities of those inputs that would be demanded byPhysicians as Agents
the consumer at the given prices if the consumer had as much informa-
tion as the agent has. That one of the services may be produced by the
agent is of little consequence. As long as the agent accepts the price as
given, and believes that he can sell as much as he wishes at that price,
the agent has no incentive to alter the quantity of any service that any
individual consumer demands, and no ability to alter the price he pays.
Of course, if consumers are so poorly informed as to need agents, then
a competitive market might not emerge. However, if some consumers
are well informed, even if others are not, a competitive market may
exist, and agents may behave optimally.
When the agent is also a monopolist in the provision of some produc-
tive input, there are two possible assumptions one might make. One
might assume that he has the patient demand the quantities a fully in-
formed patient would demand if price were set equal to marginal cost.
Alternatively, the agent might try to determine the quantity that patients
would demand at any given price if they were informed. Then, given
this "true" demand curve, the physician would set the price at the mo-
nopoly level, and recommend the "fully informed" quantity correspond-
ing to that price.
If the market is perfectly competitive, there is no reason for the
physician not to act as a pure agent, while if the market is monopolistic,
it appears to be inconsistent to assume that the physician is an income
maximizer when he sets prices but not when he offers advice. The same
motivation which leads him to set prices above marginal cost will lead
him to distort the advice he gives.
A second difficulty with the agency notion arises in situations in which
the quantity used is not the quantity that would be demanded by fully
informed consumers when price equals social marginal cost. One possi-
bility is that there is excess demand. If the physician were to act as the
agent for a given patient, he would choose to satisfy that patient's fully
informed demand. But if supply constraints make it impossible for him
to do so for all patients, then the physician cannot feasibly act as a
perfect agent for all patients.
A somewhat similar problem arises when insurance covers all or part
of the cost of services the physician orders. From the viewpoint of any
individual patient, his utility is maximized if he receives (approximately)
the quantity he would have demanded if he were fully informed and
faced a price equal to the net or user price. Even though the value to
him of the last units he purchases is probably less than their social
marginal cost, he ignores this "welfare loss" because the cost is spread
over the usually very numerous other insureds. Even an individual physi-
cian's entire list of patients is likely to be a sufficiently small fraction
of total insureds to permit the physician to ignore this welfare loss. But
consumers would prefer that all physicians adopt a rationing policy in8 Chapter One
which they receive the quantity they would have demanded at price
equalling marginal cost, not the quantity at which price equals the mar-
ginal user price. However, one would not expect the individual physicians
to adopt such a rationing policy. When insurance is present, we need to
recognize that it may not maximize aggregate patient welfare if each
physician acts as a perfect agent, in the sense of choosing the quantities
his patients demand at the user price. This ambiguity in the notion of
agency means that welfare evaluations will often be ambiguous as well.
The Tasks of the Agent
I first indicate the problem that the consumer would like the physician
acting as agent to solve. The consumer is initially assumed to maximize
a utility function in health H and other goods X.
(1) U = U(X,H)
Other goods may be purchased at a price of one dollar, but health is
not purchased directly. Rather, its production is given by:
(2) H = H0 + g(M;H0)
where Ho is initial endowment of health, and M is a vector M = (Mi,
M2,... , Mn) of medical services. Time cost is ignored in this exposi-
tion; it can easily be added without altering conclusions. The vector of
prices for medical care is P, and the consumer's income is Y. The con-
sumer's problem is to maximize the utility function (1) subject to the
production function constraint (2) and the income constraint
(3) Y = X + PM
Optimality requires that levels of medical inputs be chosen so that the
marginal health products of a dollar spent on each are equal.
_
where II is the shadow price (equal to marginal cost) of an increment
in health. Optimality requires that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween health and other goods equal its shadow price:
(5) ^ = n
The vector M* which satisfies (4) and (5) is the quantity the physician
would choose if he were able and willing to act as a perfect agent. Note
that this choice involves two subproblems. First, for whatever level of
health produced, costs should be minimized (equation [4]). Second, the
level of health should be that quantity that is demanded at the schedulePhysicians as Agents
of shadow prices (equation [5]). One may observe that the physician
qua physician is more likely to have the knowledge needed to achieve
(4) rather than (5), although even achievement of (4) requires that the
physician know input prices as well as marginal effects on health.
Using the Model
From the utility function (1) and the constraints, it is obviously pos-
sible to derive a patient demand schedule for health as a function of the
shadow price of health the patient faces. The shadow price in turn
depends upon the price of health inputs and the patient's estimate of
the marginal health products of those inputs. Given a homothetic pro-
duction function, the mix of inputs chosen depends only on their relative
marginal products and prices, not on the total amount of health de-
manded. The absolute level of marginal products determines the level
of health the patient expects to achieve. Obviously, the information
provided by the physician, or the choices that he makes, can reflect
distorted relative or absolute health products.
Even if the physician is an income maximizer, he will act as the
patient's agent in the sense of behaving in response to true relative mar-
ginal health products: he will minimize cost and will satisfy equation (4).
But I also show that in his advice to the patient he would be expected
to distort the absolute increase in health to be expected from a combi-
nation of medical inputs, and so he will not satisfy equation (5).
For simplicity, I begin by assuming that the physician maximizes his
net money income. The health production function is altered to include
explicitly two medical inputs. Input Mx is produced by the physician
(e.g., physician office visits) using his own time; Mx is available at a
constant marginal cost Px. Input M2 is sold at price P2. No physician
time is used in its production (e.g., prescription drugs or in-patient
hospital care). In terms of the intermediate inputs M1 and M2, the
health production function is:
H = H(MUM2;HO)
Suppose some increment to health A# is to be produced. If the physi-
cian acts as a perfect agent, he will choose quantities AMX and AM2
such that the ratios of their marginal products equal the ratios of their
marginal costs. We may call these quantities Mx* and M2*. Since the
production function is assumed to be homothetic, Mx*/M2* — k, a con-
stant given any level of relative prices.
The questionnow is whether the physician will choose the combina-
tion of inputs k if he acts to maximize his own income. We suppose
that the patient as patient has no preferences as to the mix of medical
care inputs, and regards the production function as a "black box"; he10 Chapter One
only cares about the health he will achieve and what he will have to
spend to get it. The price he will have to pay for any batch of medical
inputs is just the sum of their prices, but the health he expects to get
depends in part on what the doctor tells him. However this expectation
is formed, it does not, we assume, depend upon the mix or types of
intermediate inputs. The patient views the physician as a prime con-
tractor, who quotes him a total price and an expected final output. For
a given expenditure, let the increment in health the physician tells the
patient he will receive be AH; then the shadow price of a unit of health
is approximately II = — * A
 2 -. Obviously, the higher AH the
lower n will be. The lower II, the more likely it is that the consumer
will be willing to buy a larger number of units of health.
Consider first the situation in which the particular physician from
whom the consumer purchases medical care is given, and the only ques-
tion is how much the consumer will buy. If the physician is an income
maximizer, he will set his price with regard to the patient's total demand
curve for health. If he could get by with providing no inputs, he would
set his price and choose what he would tell the patient so as to yield
that shadow price for health which maximizes total revenue. If he must
provide some inputs, for reasons to be suggested later, he would still
maximize his income for any level of cost by representing AH as greater
than AH, i.e., by overstating the marginal health product of M. If, on the
other hand, there is some competition among physicians and if the
physician is a profit maximizer, his price will be set with regard to
the firm-level demand curve for health. The physician will want to rep-
resent his performance of a particular procedure as likely to add as
much or more health as performance of that procedure by any other
physician.
Once the physician and patient agree on a total expenditure and an
expected final level of health, we suppose that there must actually be
some costs incurred and that there is some increment in health that must
actually be delivered. In general, this actual level will differ from AH, but
we suppose that it is determinate. It might be, for example, the minimum
amount needed to forestall a malpractice suit, or undesirable competi-
tive repercussions, or the consumer's prior knowledge might determine
a maximum ratio of AH to AH. With total expenditures already deter-
mined, and with the actual level of AH to be produced fixed by these
minimal consumer expectations, physician income maximization will
clearly require that the actual level of AH be produced in least-cost
fashion. This is so even if some of the total expenditure goes for inputs
which the physician himself does not employ, since the initial bargaining
and information exchange only fixed the total expenditure for treatment,
not its division among types of treatment. Were the physician to select11 Physicians as Agents
anything other than the cost-minimizing input combination for whatever
level of H he finally produces, he would reduce the amount he himself
could collect. In summary, deviations from perfect agency would be
limited to misrepresenting the marginal health product of care in gen-
eral, and hence the shadow price of health.
Choice of Input Combinations in Practice
While it is a simple point that the income-maximizing physician will
be likely to choose the cost-minimizing combination of inputs, it seems
not to be recognized in much of the discussion of physician behavior,
and in comparisons between that behavior under fee-for-service and
prepaid group practice. Consider two kinds of other inputs: hospital
admissions and prescription drugs. Both of these are almost always
purchased (at least initially) in conjunction with physicians' services.
Given a demand constraint (whether demand is competitive or not), the
discussion above indicates that the maximizing physician has an incen-
tive to choose the least-cost combination and type of inputs.
Yet it has often been alleged that such incentives are absent. For
example, it has often been argued that physicians will tend to overuse
hospital inputs primarily because they are "free." It is true that the cost
of these inputs is not billed to the physician, but they are far from free
if insurance coverage is not full. Of course, full insurance coverage
makes them appear to be free, but this incentive would also appear in
a prepaid group if it purchased its hospital insurance as a member of a
large pool.
As another example, Victor Fuchs has stated, in connection with
prescription drugs, "If (contrary to fact) the physician had a financial
stake in keeping down the cost of drugs he prescribes, as he would
under a comprehensive prepayment plan, he might be motivated to
examine more closely drug prices and alternative products and he un-
doubtedly would also be less susceptible to persuasive detail men and
high pressure advertising."
8 In fact, the physician does have a financial
stake under an ideal fee-for-service market. Given the above formulation
of demand, higher patient payments for prescription drugs reduce what
the physician can charge for his own services. If the patient were willing
to pay a higher price for, say, the more expensive branded drug the
physician prescribed, he would also have been willing to pay the physi-
cian a higher fee. Indeed, the incentive to cost minimize is likely to be
stronger at the level of the individual physician under fee-for-service
than in a prepaid group, since a dollar in extra drug or hospital user
costs reduces the fee-for-service physician's income by a full dollar,
while in a typical prepaid practice the reduction in an individual physi-
cian's share would ordinarily be somewhat less.12 Chapter One
All of this does not, of course, imply that actual choices one observes
will be efficient; it only says that money income is maximized if they are
efficient. If we look at studies of physicians' office practices, and exam-
ine how physicians use inputs for which they do pay directly, one gen-
erally finds that physicians have not made efficient choices. While there
has not been much evidence of technical inefficiency, there is evidence
that physicians do not use the net income-maximizing (or cost mini-
mizing) number of aides.
9
If physicians do not cost minimize in the choice of inputs in their
own offices, one should probably not expect them to cost minimize in
their choice of inputs elsewhere. Thus it seems to be very misleading
to view such alleged inefficiencies as arising from the lack of financial
incentives, or to view the prepaid group's incentive structure as some-
thing which would lead to improvement.
The question then becomes: Why do they not cost minimize? There
are three possible explanations offered for the results in office practices.
The first is that physicians do not know what the cost-minimizing com-
bination is; for example, they mistakenly underestimate aide produc-
tivity. Usually it is not alleged that physicians are unaware of studies
which show high aide productivity. Rather, they are held to be ignorant
of how to use aide time efficiently in their own practices; they may not
know how to delegate.
But this only appears to push the argument back a step. It is not that
physicians underpurchase aides; it is that they underuse information on
how to use aides. Welfare evaluation of such arguments is difficult,
because of the problem of specifying the value of information when the
buyer is intrinsically uncertain about what the information may tell him.
Nevertheless, there appear to be no barriers to the spread of informa-
tion on the use of aides. Such information is not generally of a public
goods nature, since the physician would need to know how to use aides
in his own practice. The probable reason why a physician has not experi-
mented with more aides, and so does not know how to use them, is that
the cost of experimentation exceeds the expected gains from future use
of the aides. Similarly, the reason why physicians do not know when
generic drugs are therapeutically equivalent to branded drugs is because
the cost of the information is too great. Here the "information" is not
generally the facts themselves, for those are reported in the Medical
Letter, available at a nominal price. It is the cost of perusing and digest-
ing this information. In summary, while lack of information may be a
reason for nonuse of the least cost technique, it is not obvious that,
when the costs of obtaining and processing information are added, the
total costs of adopting and using the "least-cost" technique really are
the lowest.13 Physicians as Agents
The second explanation is that output is measured improperly: a task
performed by an aide really is not as productive or valuable as a task
performed by a physician. While questionnaire surveys indicate that
those patients who use services do not always feel this way, this question
has never been answered definitively. It is hard to believe that, for tasks
which involve diagnosis or judgment (as opposed to mechanical skill),
a patient would not prefer a physician. Recent work by Coate on op-
tometry, in which outputs can be measured much more easily, indicates
little or no aide underuse.
1
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The third reason is that there are psychological costs to the monitor-
ing and supervision of aides. Although monitoring an aide's performance
may not take the physician more time, monitoring may take more effort
or require him to reduce patient contact in which he takes pleasure. He
may simply not prefer to work in the style of practice associated with
larger numbers of aides; there is little in the process of physician selec-
tion, training, or continuing education which is likely to result in high
levels of skill in personnel management. This last reason may be a plau-
sible explanation for the observed facts: physicians do not choose the
cheapest drug or the ideal number of aides because they do not want to
take the effort to seek the most efficient method of practice.
It is important to recognize the welfare implications of this explana-
tion: if these costs do exist, it is not necessarily inefficient to do the
inefficient thing. Put differently, the compensation that physicians would
have to be paid to induce them to search out the cheapest drug or make
the effort to supervise aides would exceed the cost savings to be realized.
Put still differently, a rule which required physicians to use the optimal
number of aides, or search for the cheapest drug, might indeed reduce
costs. But it would make physicians worse off. The amount physicians
might be willing to pay to remove the rule might exceed the amount of
cost saving. Distributional questions aside, "efficiency" is not necessarily
desirable; psychic costs are not imaginary; they are as real as the value
of leisure time that the worker gives up or the enjoyment of goods and
services that a consumer must sacrifice. The utility-maximizing behav-
ior of physicians may make this case differ from the normal one of joint
products. Utility maximization by physicians, as suppliers and managers,
may indeed make medical services in general, and prescription drugs in
particular, different from furniture or automobiles.
There is, of course, a distributional effect, a question of property
rights. Forcing physicians to do the efficient thing may permit the class
of consumers to be better off, but it makes physicians worse off. More
to the point, the amount by which physicians are made worse off ex-
ceeds the amount by which consumers are made better off. The class of
physicians could offer a bribe to consumers not to impose "efficiency"14 Chapter One
rules on them which would exceed the gains consumers might expect
from increased efficiency. The fairytale character of this political fable
suggests that we might expect such "efficiency" rules to be imposed
even if they are inefficient, just because consumers are more numerous
(though perhaps not always more politically potent) than physicians.
Unequal Information, or A Little Knowledge
Can Be a Dangerous Thing
In the preceding discussion I assumed that the individual consumer
determined how much medical care to buy in total, and how much to
buy from each provider, on the basis of the total price (over all inputs)
that he would have to pay for an increment of health. The consumer
was assumed to pay no attention either to the mix or to the prices of
individual intermediate inputs. There are two possible objections to this
assumption. First, individuals may judge the health outcomes they ex-
pect to receive not just by what the physician tells them, but by the
actual intermediate inputs provided. If consumers think they will be
more likely to recover with a branded drug than a generic one, or with
any prescription at all (even an unnecessary one), rather than just advice
and hand-holding, then obviously the cost-minimizing mix of inputs may
not maximize physician income. Income-maximizing physicians may find
it worthwhile to cater to uninformed consumer desires. Second, and
possibly more important, it is plausible to conjecture that the elasticity
of demand for health from a given provider may not be the same for all
input mixes. (Even if this elasticity were the same, of course, the elas-
ticities of demand for individual inputs would generally differ. Doubling
the surgeon's fee will generally have less effect on the demand for hos-
pital admissions than would doubling the hospital price, even given equal
insurance coverage.) Differences may arise because the consumer has
different amounts of information about the prices and practices of vari-
ous physicians.
Concretely, consumers may have a rough idea of what a physician's
fee for an office visit ought to be. Suppose the consumer has some infor-
mation about the going prices for routine physician services. He knows
that an office visit typically costs between $10 and $20. He has very
little information on the prices, types, and quantities of prescription
drugs provided for various illnesses, or the usefulness of hospitalization
or laboratory tests in connection with a particular illness. Suppose that
physicians in his area typically order $30 worth of diagnostic tests for a
particular condition, and charge $15 for an office visit. Suppose the tests
are in fact worthless, or nearly so. By the argument in the section "Using
the Model," each physician would have an incentive to stop ordering
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of the gains from not prescribing the test. Suppose a particular physician
raised his office fee to $30, and prescribed no tests. Under full informa-
tion this would attract patients to him, since his cost for treating the
illness is $30, as opposed to $45 total cost for other physicians. But if
consumers do not observe the total cost, but only the $30 versus $15
difference in office fees, this cost-minimizing physician may actually lose
patients even while making them better off.
More formally, the problem is that, if information differs in this way,
the firm-level demand elasticity may be smaller with respect to the prices
of the "ordered" inputs than with respect to the physician's own input.
While the physician would have an incentive to inform patients of his
low-cost mode of treatment (and many do), this ability is limited by
restrictions on advertising and the heterogeneity of treatment modes.
An interesting empirical question would be whether the elasticities do
differ in this way.
A second possibility is that, however desirable it might be, the physi-
cian may be unable to vary his own charge. This may happen because
of third party reimbursement arrangements or because of price controls.
However desirable price limitation may be for other reasons, it does
have the effect of eliminating any cost-minimization incentive to the
physician who does not have excess capacity, for he will be unable to
capture any cost savings in his own fee. If he is willing to supply more
output at the going price than is demanded of him, then he may be able
to increase the quantity demanded from him by lowering the cost of
other inputs.
Conclusion
That physicians only direct rather than pay for many other health
inputs need not lead to departures from cost-minimizing behavior. This
conclusion holds even though physicians may be able to induce con-
sumers to obtain amounts of health, and consequently amounts of med-
ical care services of all types, that differ from those that would have
been provided were consumers not ignorant. How consumers decide
how much to believe of what physicians tell them and how their beliefs
affect their consumption decisions and constrain the actions of physicians
will be treated in more detail in subsequent chapters.